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KEEPING OUR HAND IN: PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

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Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization.

Sun Tzu - The Art of War

KEEPING OUR HAND IN: PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

INTRODUCTION

Today Partnership for Peace (PfP) includes 45 nations, almost a quarter of those on the planet. The Partnership is arguably NATO's most successful institutional and procedural adaptation to its perceived post-Cold War security challenges, with every sign of expanding in scope. Although purely a military instrument at its inception, it has additionally come to embrace civil concerns, and today is a successful underpinning not only to its members' security environments but also to other elements of their geopolitical concerns. The goodness of PfP is manifold. Participation is seen as a means to an end by nations who desire closer military, political, economic and cultural relationships with the West. It is also a boon to NATO: the relationships and practical experience gained through PfP make future NATO actions within its AOR and beyond much easier to execute, and PfP also constitutes a "junior membership" that allows active partnering yet largely succors those who oppose an enlarged NATO. Finally, PfP is good for the United States. Participation in its many activities allows us to prevent "continental drift" by Europe away from the U.S., and gives us the opportunity to build relationships with numerous emerging nations, at a time when budget cuts elsewhere in our government have decreased our presence abroad.

This paper will examine PfP's inception, current state, and future projections, and close with recommendations, chief among them that the U.S continues its active participation in the Partnership. PfP truly allows us, at relatively low cost, to "keep a hand in" in NATO, Europe and nations on the European periphery.

THE PAST – REACTING TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The suddenness with which the Soviet Union imploded at the close of the Cold War in Europe caught the West's political leaders by surprise. While an assured peace and an end to the arms race were long hoped for, they were not envisioned to arrive so quickly. As a result, when the end of the Cold War did occur, there was an institutional vacuum.

To its credit, NATO took some of the first steps towards the East. In 1991, it created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), an outreach program whose charter was to formalize an institutional basis for cooperation and discussion with the former members of the Warsaw Pact.¹ This was based on historical example: NATO's inception had prevented the re-nationalization of defense forces in Western Europe – the NACC would do the same for Eastern Europe. The difference now was that we operated in a more complicated environment than ever before, one threatened by weapons of mass destruction, terrorist groups, and smaller-scale regional crises. The NACC was a good start, and reflective of positive intentions by consensus of all of NATO's members, but its largest practical effect was to give the former Warsaw Pact nations liaison status at NATO headquarters. Additional efforts were required to create an active relationship, and the impetus to do so came from the U.S., in the burst of activity that marked the creation of a formal foreign policy by a new Presidential administration.

In late summer 1993 President Clinton was under attack by the Republicans and others for his conduct as Commander-In-Chief. He was assailed for "...over-reliance on

¹ Marybeth Ulrich. *NATO's Identity at a Crossroads: Institutional Challenges Posed by NATO's Enlargement and Partnership for Peace Program*. (Conference Paper, International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention, Wash., D.C., Feb 1999), 4.


the U.N. in Haiti, timidity in Haiti, and fickleness in Bosnia.”² In short, his administration was seen as one that relied on crises in foreign affairs to give it the impetus to act. Clinton had concentrated primarily on domestic issues in his first months in office, and actually preferred ad hoc efforts in reaction to world situations, but even he ultimately understood the need to develop a foreign policy that would bring order to events. That doctrine, authored by then-NSC Tony Lake in late 1993, ensured that the U.S. would not merely contain, but engage (the actual term used was “enlargement”), and although it concentrated on economic enlargement (with a goal of creating trade-linked democracies), along with such initiatives as GATT and NAFTA came another form of engagement: PfP. Clinton highlighted the latter and NATO enlargement in his January 1994 address at the NATO Summit in Brussels. NATO enlargement would “reach to democratic states to our East as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe,” and PfP partnership would “serve one of the most important goals in our enlargement strategy...building a stable environment in which the new democracies and free markets of Eastern and Central Europe and the former USSR can flourish.”³

The NATO member nations acceded in 1994, and PfP was born under the auspices of the alliance. NATO’s assigned training missions (not in directed order) were: combat operations; humanitarian operations; and peacekeeping. Initial PfP activities were small-scale in scope, but numerous. They included lowest-level tactical training, such as squad, platoon, and company exchanges, and partner classes and seminars of a military nature, almost all bilateral in nature between NATO militaries and new

² Douglas Brinkley. *Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine*. (Foreign Policy, Spring 1997), 120.

³ Brinkley, 125.

Partnership members. PfP takers were numerous, and included all of the former Eastern BLOC nations and all but one former member of the USSR (Tajikistan). Three Western European nations who were not original targets of PfP additionally signed on: Austria; Ireland; and Sweden.⁴ Below is an up to date diagram of the PfP national membership, also indicating current EU and NATO affiliation.⁵



How did these nations join PfP? They had to apply to NATO by signing a framework document that committed each to core NATO values: “the preservation of democratic societies, the commitment to international law, and the intent to cooperate with NATO to develop compatible military forces.”⁶ The upshot of this was that NATO also groomed military forces outside of its assigned force and earmarked force realms – it now potentially had “other forces” which might fall under its operational command,

⁴ Eric Vanhoeve. *Introduction to NATO*. (National Defense University NATO Course Materials, Jan 2001).

⁵ Ibid. Chart adaptation. Although they are all members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and have some peripheral representation on common European defense matters, the following European/former Soviet states not in the PfP are: Andorra, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia.

⁶ Ulrich, 7.

contingent on the concurrence of a providing nation's government.⁷ This actually occurred during IFOR and SFOR, as PfP nations offered soldiers in peacekeeping roles. The lessons learned from those experiences and all tactical training conducted led NATO to expand PfP to the operational realm by 1997, so as to better train with as many PfP member higher headquarters as possible. This initiative included the possibility of staff or individual involvement in NATO-led CJTFs.⁸

These PfP events and exercises had four benefits. First, NATO started to realize a greater potential overall military capability, one that it harnessed during the Kosovo campaign when it required and gained selective airfield, port, ground transit and overflight assistance from PfP nations (Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia).⁹ Second, after its IFOR involvement, Russia became more comfortable with NATO expansion (to a point), after it was able to see “from the inside” that NATO did not have predatory designs. Third, nations that desired NATO membership, but understood that inclusion might be drawn-out or difficult, at least gained the legitimacy associated with PfP membership. Finally, all member nations were able to learn from their professional military associations, applying their lessons learned across a host of military considerations, such as: doctrine; force structure; and internal training requirements.

Civilian control in all cases was reinforced by common Ministerial decision in 1996, renaming the NACC the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and inviting the PfP nations to join this body concurrent with Partnership membership. The EAPC

⁷ Vanhoeve.

⁸ NATO Press Office. *The NATO Handbook*. (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1998), 95.

⁹ Charles Dale. *Partnership, An Alliance Fundamental Security Task*. (NATO Planning and Operations Division Paper delivered at the PfP Planning Symposium 2000, Jan 2000), 2.

provided civilian oversight to the PfP alongside NATO, and made provisions for consultations in the following areas: Crisis Management, Regional Matters, Arms Control, NBC Proliferation, Defense Planning, Defense Budgets, and Science and Economics.¹⁰

THE PRESENT – A DYNAMIC PARTNERSHIP

Today PfP is alive and well, and includes both home station partnering operations and deployed activities (in the Balkans). In the SFOR AOR alone right now, there are 2,000 soldiers serving from nineteen member nations (also know as NNTCNs – Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations). In KFOR, the number is 8,000 soldiers from twenty-six NNTCNs.¹¹ At home station training areas, lower-level tactical troop exchanges still take place, particularly between NATO members and non-NATO PfP participants, but there is a trend is to attempt larger exercises – up to brigade-level equivalents by all of the services, and well beyond bilateral “adjacent unit” exchange. Tactical formation mixes of up to five and six nations are becoming more common, and do not always include the U.S. All told, the trends are up in the tactical realm. Military exercises that involved more than two nations numbered: three in 1994; eight in 1995; 14 in 1996; 24 in 1997; and 21 in 1998¹².

Command Post Exercises (CPXs) at Division, Corps, Army and Theater level are also receiving much attention, and have perhaps done the most to improve NATO-PfP

¹⁰ Military Staff (J-5), SHAPE. *ACE Directive 87-1: Military Cooperation within the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council ,including Partnership for Peace*. (SHAPE Printing and Distribution Office, 1999), 1-1.

¹¹ Vanhoeve.

¹² Ulrich, 7.

interoperability. In addition to a greater overall military proficiency gained on the part of all participants, another positive outcome of these higher-level exercises has been the inclusion of government agency leaders as participants. Various large-impact exercise events, such as WMD appearance, and other events, such as the no-notice need to open commercial ground facilities or open civil air routes to support military operations, have educated the PfP nations as to the need for their civil governments to plan for and effect non-military security obligations. As a result of CPX findings in 1999, for example, the PfP has codified Airspace Management/Control, Political (and Defense) Efforts Against NBC Proliferation, and Civil Emergency Planning to its standard list of future objectives to be pursued in the 2000-2001 time frame.¹³

The U.S. track record has been one of funded participation down to the lowest levels, consistent with our OPTEMPO, as driven by explicit mention of partnership activities in our key strategic documents: the National Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the State Department's Strategic Plan for International Affairs, and the EUCOM Commander's Theater Engagement Plan.

THE FUTURE – WHAT SHOULD OUR ROLE BE?

PfP is in no danger in the future. It is too meaningful to all parties concerned – a permanent part of Europe's security architecture. The following are observations as to the future of PfP and recommendations as to the necessary participation of the U.S.

We should expect to see PfP programs tweaked by NATO and the Partnership. As the current Army Attache to the German Ambassador related to me last month, "PfP is good for all of us -- the challenge now is to continue to refine it, to improve its

¹³ NATO Website, PfP Document Section, <http://nato.int/pfp/docu/d990616a.htm>

quality.”¹⁴ PfP has certainly undergone a metamorphosis from small unit to larger scale exercises through its short history. It will likely take some continued refinement to hold the continued interest of all its members, and in any case, we have not yet maximized its potential. If we are to exploit greater capability, we should actively encourage combined multiple service exercises at the field training exercise (FTX) level, and the CJTF concept at the CPX level, and stay engaged ourselves. This includes U.S. representation at European PfP conferences, typically held annually, and ensuring U.S. staff representation in the NATO headquarters in Europe that formulate PfP programs (SHAPE) and enact them (the five regional commands and eleven sub-regional commands). In addition, the improvements in performance of FTXing and CPXing units would satisfy several of the SACEUR’s post-Kosovo improvement desires as articulated in the current NATO Strategic Concept.

By honing the Partnership’s capability through the introduction of operations of greater complexity, we should not, however, leave the small nations in the dust. We must continue to give them access to and participation in PfP. Marginalization would likely deny us relationships and access that we may need in the future. We should strive to allot some individual, staff, or sub-unit roles to the larger scale exercises described in the preceding paragraph, and at a minimum continue to encourage PfP participation on lower levels consistent with the abilities and interest of the participants. One tactic might be to encourage regional bilateral or trilateral exercises, with U.S. assistance or observation where possible, so we derive the benefit of presence and information gathering on the ground.

¹⁴ 11 Mar 2001 Conversation with COL Norbert Stier, as part of our RSS Embassy Visit.

We should also anticipate changes in PfP membership. NATO has expanded four times since its inception: PfP may also expand anew. Out of the box thinking as regards inclusion isn't foreign to NATO at all. As an example, since 1994 the alliance has carried on a "Mediterranean Dialogue" on a variety of security cooperation concerns with nations as removed as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁵

We ought to expect to see nations continue to see PfP as a stepping-stone to NATO acceptance, and clear up any misconceptions surrounding that progression. NATO has laid out very ambiguous entry requirements for acceptance. We should work for explicit language where we can, so we do not needlessly frustrate nations that explicitly desire NATO membership as a result of PfP participation, and we should communicate this through political channels in addition to military ones. As an example of what not to do to our partners, in 1999 the Lithuanian national military chain of command was forced to explain to its Parliament that it still had no idea what true NATO membership entailed, although it had been a PfP member and NATO aspirant for five years. Latvia and Romania have had similar experiences.¹⁶ We also don't need to deceive PfP members that contributions to peacekeeping activities or land/airspace use are a guaranteed ticket to NATO membership.

We should tout PfP as the robust program that it is, an end in and of itself. Some nations, specifically Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, have explicitly stated that they do not want to be NATO members, but have seen in PfP a perfect way to stay engaged and enhance their own security postures while not getting dragged into the

¹⁵ NATO Fact Sheet, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/med-dia.htm>

¹⁶ Ulrich, 13.

trappings of a full-blown alliance.¹⁷ This philosophy is a practical one, and some nations are probably best off as PfP and not NATO members for the foreseeable future, particularly those that have delicate relationships with Russia.

We need to treat Russia as a member in good standing wherever possible. PfP is a perfect way to tie them to us in a common security structure, and a perfect method of letting them see how we operate so that they can lessen their historical suspicions of outsiders.

We must recognize that with so many actors in PfP, and with larger exercises becoming the norm, that we lay ourselves open to intelligence collection activities by those purporting to be friendly. We need to agree on any physical security restrictions we must place on machines and information, and enact those plans.

We need to be aware of but not overreact to the progression of the European Self Defense Initiative (ESDI). Positive PfP experiences, especially those without U.S. involvement, may make the EU more confident in its ability to pursue ESDI. We should remember history, however. The Europeans have had an independent streak for a long time – as far back as 1963, French President Charles De Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysee Treaty that recognized a PfP-like bilateral relationship (France and Germany agreed to act in concert to “harmonize their strategic and tactical doctrines”, institutionalizing frequent meetings between the two nation’s foreign ministers, defense ministers and military chiefs of staff, and including the exchange of military liaison officers and students).¹⁸ The lesson for the U.S. is to remain

¹⁷ Ibid, 14.

¹⁸ Karen E. Donfried. *The Franco-German Eurocorps: Implications for the U.S. Security Role in Europe*. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1992), 1.

embedded and an indispensable part of the PfP, and to be sensitive but not oversensitive to signs of change.

Civil agency participation in large-scale CPXs should continue. Through partnership activities we can highlight the need for civil mechanisms, such as WMD response teams, FEMA-like organizations, and mass casualty-capable hospitals, to cope with the effects of military activities. Now is the time to highlight the challenges, help with our expertise (or hardware) and get on with it. Better now than later when a true crisis might exist.

A final note on funding is in order. PfP is of course not the only type of military presence we maintain overseas. It competes with a host of activities: other international military exercises and military to military contacts; presence missions; defense cooperation activities; foreign military sales; the International Military Education and Training program; treaty obligations and security commitments; peacekeeping operations; humanitarian assistance; and counter drug operations.¹⁹ But it is a unique program in its goal of harnessing the security concerns of so many nations at so many levels. Peace preservation is almost always a less costly alternative to making war.

CONCLUSION

PfP is an invaluable enhancement for European and member nation security, and if kept a viable and relevant partnership, is well worth the expense and complication of membership. It should not be seen by any nation as a lesser vehicle than NATO, but as a substantive program, an end in itself, particularly for nations that do not choose to enter

¹⁹ It is encouraging to note that many of the contributors to *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*, published by the NDU QDR Working Group, give mention to PfP.

into the wider, more all-encompassing security regime that NATO represents. The U.S. in particular benefits by PfP's continued existence, as it allows us to maintain the formal and informal relationships that enhance our common security goals, and also influence events in Europe. The current administration should support PfP wherever possible.

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